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INTRODUCTION

and
trends are apparent in the regulation
perhaps contradictory
wo
of the nonprofit sector. First, as this symposium's call
self-regulation
for papers indicated, "federalization" of nonprofit regulation is increasing.
There are multiple examples, several mentioned in the call for papers: The
Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) issuance of a new IRS Form 990 that goes
beyond information required earlier;' federal (particularly congressional)
scrutiny of "many non-tax aspects of hospital operations"; and the intensive
federal attention to foundation risk procedures and internal governance
matters in the so-called voluntary guidelines applicable to overseas grant
makers in the wake of the September 11 attacks. In a recent article,
Lloyd Mayer and Brendan Wilson noted that "[miembers of Congress,

T

congressional staff, and .

.

. Internal Revenue Service officials have

called for an expanded federal role" in nonprofit regulation, citing the staff
of the Senate Finance Committee, government officials, and academic
commentators on the issue.'
Counterbalancing those increasing calls for "federalization" is the
growth of self-regulation. Increased regulation and federalization of

i Professor of Law and Lauridsen Family Fellow, University of Iowa; President,
International Society for Third Sector Research (ISTR) (2008-2010). Professor Sidel also
served as a member of the Committee on Nonprofit Self-Regulation of the Advisory Panel
on the Nonprofit Sector convened by Independent Sector (2006-2oo7) that produced the
Principlesfor Good Governanceand EthicalPractice:A Guidefor CharitiesandFoundations(Panel
on the Nonprofit Sector, 2007). Thanks to Nathan Jackson for research assistance. Comments
welcome to mark-sidel@uiowa.edu.
2 IRS, FORM 990(2010).

3 Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Treenty-First
Century: An InstitutionalChoice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 479 (2oo). For a skeptical view, see James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS's Nonprofit Corporate Governance
Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REv. 545 (2010).
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the regulation of nonprofits is being matched by the development and
spread of nonprofit self-regulation, perhaps more quickly than some of
self-regulation's persistent critics might have imagined. In recent years,
for example, we have seen the emergence, after careful work and much
consultation, of the Principlesfor Good Governance and Ethical Practice:
A Guide for Charities and Foundations.The Principles are by far the most
detailed and substantive attempt at self-regulation of the broad charitable
and philanthropic sector since Independent Sector and others began these
multiple efforts in the 1970s.4 And we have seen the development of
successful self-regulatory programs in a number of nonprofit sub-sectors,
such as land trusts,' successful quality enhancement self-regulatory efforts
in many states, 6 and strengthened quality enhancement self-regulatory
efforts in the community foundation area. In the philanthropic arena, while
self-regulation of private foundations remains very weak, the situation has
changed considerably in the community foundation field.' For a number
of years, the range, scope, and impact of the National Standardsfor U.S.
Community Foundations has been growing in surprisingly effective ways.'
More than 450 of the 700 community foundations in the United States
4 See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, INDEPENDENT SECTOR, PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD
GOVERNANCE AND ETHICAL PRACTICE: A GUIDE FOR CHARITIES AND FOUNDATIONS, (2007),
available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/report/principles/principlesguide.pdf. For the
earlier efforts, see, e.g., Robert 0. Bothwell, Trends in Self-Regulation and Transparency of
Nonprofit Organizationsin the U.S., 4 INT'L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. no. I, Sept. 2oo1, http:l
www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol4iss I/art- I.htm; INDEPENDENT SECTOR, OBEDIENCE TO THE
UNENFORCEABLE:

ETHICS AND THE NATION'S VOLUNTARY AND PHILANTHROPIC COMMUNITY

(1991), availableat www.aahsa.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?Linkldentifier-id&ItemlD=3572.

5 For information on the work of the Land Trust Accreditation Commission and the Land
Trust Standards and Practices, see Accreditation,LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/training/accreditation (last visited Mar. 8, 2011); see also Tammara Van Ryn, SelfRegulation in the NonprofitSector: Land Trusts as a Case Study, VT. LAW SCH. PODCASTS (June
29, 2006), http://vlspodcasts.wordpress.com/zoo7/07/o5/self-regulation-in-the-nonprofitsector-land-trusts-as-a-case-study/.
6 See, e.g., IOWA GOVERNOR'S NONPROFIT TASK FORCE, IOWA PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES
FOR CHARITABLE NONPROFIT EXCELLENCE (rev. ed. 2oo8), http://www.sos.state.ia.us/pdfs/
Nonprofits/IAPP4CNE.pdf; MINN. COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES FOR
NONPROFIT EXCELLENCE (20o0), http://www.minnesotanonprofits.org/PrinciplesPractices.
pdf.
7 The only significant self-regulatory mechanism available in the philanthropic arena
is the National Standards for U.S. Community Foundations administered by the Council
on Foundations. See About National Standards,CmTy. FOUNDS. NAT'L STANDARDS BD., http:/l
www.cfstandards.org/About-us/about-us.asp (last visited Mar. 8, 2011). Although there have
been efforts to establish standards for private foundations, these are weak and largely unenforced. See, e.g., The Council, Getty, andthe Limits of Self-Regulation, NAT'L COMM. FOR RESPONSIVE
PHILANTHROPY (Dec. 23, 2005), http://blog.ncrp.org/2005/I2/council-getty-and-limits-of-self.
html.
8 See COUNCIL ON FOUNDS., NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR U.S. COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS
(2004), available at http://www.cof.org/files/Documents/CommunityFoundations/National
Standards/NationalStandards.pdf.
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have self-confirmed their compliance with the Standards, and at least 70
more are working on compliance-a compliance rate for non-mandatory
self-regulation requiring extensive reporting and internal discussion of
standards that would be the envy of most industries.9
So, what happens when increasing, though fragmented, aspects of
the "federalization" of nonprofit law meet the growth of nonprofit and
philanthropic self-regulation? Is there any reason to think that we may,
or should, be moving toward increased "federalization" of nonprofit selfregulation or that federalizing impulses are affecting the development
of self-regulation? What are some of the implications and challenges of
increasing self-regulation for government regulation (and particularly
increased federalization of that regulation) in the nonprofit sector? This
introductory foray into the question of any potential "federalization" of
nonprofit self-regulation contains more questions than answers for the
future of this area of the law. These are merely some initial thoughts on a
topic likely to gather more attention in the years ahead.

I.

"FEDERALIZING" NONPROFIT SELF-REGULATION: MANY MEANINGS

"Federalization" can take many forms, as the contributors to this
symposium acknowledge and discuss, and any thinking about "federalizing"
nonprofit regulation or self-regulation needs to be broadly gauged as well.
The narrowest of these notions is actual takeover, by national regulation,
of functions currently handled in other ways. The most common of these
"takeover" forms of "federalization," discussed in several other papers
in this symposium, is either the creeping or explicit expansion of federal
regulation into areas traditionally regulated by the states-a kind of
reverse regulatory devolution. But I start here with much broader notions
of "federalization," particularly when it comes to the question of positive
regulation and self-regulation in the nonprofit context.
One broader idea of "federalization" that seems worth discussing in
the nonprofit self-regulation context is the idea of attempts by Congress
and the executive branch to encourage stricter nonprofit self-regulation
and, especially, to influence the nonprofit sector's choice of self-regulatory
models and providers. That is the idea of "federalization" as a mandate for
self-regulation, and even as the potential choice of self-regulatory providers
and arbiters.
One fairly recent example of such an attempt to put a kind of
"federalizing" thumb on the scale of nonprofit self-regulation was the
widely-circulated written recommendation by the staff of the Senate
Finance Committee to preference a particular self-regulatory model
and provider, and to provide that organization with funding. Although
9 About NationalStandards,supra note 7. Data is as of April 2oo9 and is almost certainly
higher now.
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ultimately unsuccessful, the Senate staff suggested that funds be provided
for self-regulation efforts-itself an interesting step toward "federalization"
of nonprofit self-regulation. But, more important for our purposes, the
Senate staff draft explicitly endorsed the approach taken in Maryland (and
now nationally) by the Standards of Excellence project, one of a number
of ethics and accountability codes and programs now available for the
nonprofit sector through what I have elsewhere called-and not always
positively-"associational entrepreneurs.""o
The Senate staff draft suggested that the IRS contract with nongovernmental self-regulatory organizations and endorsed the notion that
the IRS directly condition "charitable status" or "authority of a charity to
accept charitable donations" on accreditation." This may have been among
the first discussions of direct federal incentives for nonprofit self-regulation.
The Finance Committee staff recommended:
There would be an authorization of $10 million to the IRS to support
accreditation of charities nationwide, in States, as well as accreditation of
charities of particular classes (e.g. private foundations, land conservation
groups, etc.). The IRS can initiate its own accreditation efforts as well as
solicit requests. Priority would be given to proposals with matching dollars.
The IRS would have the authority to contract with tax exempt organizations
that would create and manage an accreditation program to establish best
practices . . . and review organizations on an ongoing basis for compliance.

Such organizations could require dues by members to meet costs; and
contract authority to review member information and take corrective action.
The IRS would have the authority to base charitable status or authority
of a charity to accept charitable donations on whether an organization is
accredited. The proposal should encourage accreditation that is already
taking place at the state level (e.g. Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Georgia
and Louisiana) or in particular classes (nonprofit hospitals, zoos and
universities already subject to accreditation)."
The Staff Discussion Draft explicitly cited the standards promulgated by
and through the efforts of the Maryland Standards for Excellence Institute,
and directly cited the work of that particular associational entrepreneur."
And the staff draft went further, calling for a broader program of alliance
and incentives with self-regulators through
1o Mark Sidel, The Guardians GuardingThemselves: A ComparativePerspective on Nonprofit
Self-Regulation, 8o Cm.-KENT L. REV. 803, 8I I-i2 (2o05).
II STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., lo8TH CONG., STAFF DiscussioN DRAr 14 (Comm. Print
2004) [hereinafter STAFF DiscussioN DRAFr], availabeathttp://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/o622o4stfdis.pdf. For an initial response from the nonprofit community to this proposal,
See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, INDEPENDENT SECTOR, INTERIM REPORT PRESENTED
TO THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE (2005), availableat http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/about/

interim/PanelReport.pdf.
12 STAFF DiscussioN DRAFT, supra note I I, at 14-15 (citations omitted).
I3 Id.
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[flunding of $25 million for nonprofit exempt organizations that educate

other tax exempt organizations on best practices and inform the public of*
charities that are engaged in best practices; such funds would be provided
to State organizations as well as national organizations to ensure an
education presence in each state; a priority would be given to organizations
4
that assist small charities in meeting proper standards and accreditation.1
Here we have a confluence of interests seeking to accomplish multiple
goals: avoiding some stricter government regulation of the "good charities"
by strengthening self-regulation; providing direct incentives, both fiscal and
regulatory, for compliance with self-regulation; and handling these issues in
partnership with a nimble associational entrepreneur that understands both
the importance of the new self-regulatory movement and the importance
of incentives and government in its spread, and that seeks government
endorsement and support for its organizational expansion.
Note, in particular, how far that informal proposal went: "The IRS can
initiate its own accreditation efforts as well as solicit requests. . . . The IRS
would have the authority to base charitable status or authority of a charity
to accept charitable donations on whether an organization is accredited."'
This is (or would have been) true "federalization," either through "the
IRS . . . initiat[ing] its own accreditation efforts" (presumably through

intermediaries), or "bas[ing] charitable status or authority of a charity to
accept charitable donations on ... accredit[ation]." Either is truly extensive,
and neither has been fully discussed in the American context.
Another element of "federalization," related to the "accreditation"
notion above, is the potential use of nonprofit self-regulation by the federal
government. This is occurring in some other industries, as indicated
below. And here we have more questions than answers at present. Are
legislators and executive agency personnel using the multiplying forms of
nonprofit self-regulation to gather data and make the case for new forms
of regulation, new forms of information gathering, or other legislative or
executive activities? Are the federal legislative and executive branches
learning anything useful from the new nonprofit self-regulation to expand
their federalization activities? Or perhaps, in some cases, will they decide
not to compete with the expansion of self-regulation?
A third question about any potential notions of "federalization" of
nonprofit self-regulation is whether more regulation means less selfregulation. Here too research questions outstrip the data currently available
from actual practice. Will we see less acceptance or compliance with
non-mandatory forms of nonprofit self-regulation as mandatory federal
regulation and reporting requirements increase? At least initially, this does

14 Id. at 15.
15 Id. at 14 (citations omitted).
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not appear to be the case. For example, the revised and strengthened
Form 990 has been issued at the same time as some in the sector seek
to spread compliance with the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector's relatively
new (2007) Principlesfor Good Governance and Ethical Practice: A Guide for
Charities and Foundations,as well sub-sectoral self-regulatory mechanisms,
state self-regulatory principles, and other efforts. It does not appear, from
recent events, that we are seeing a decline in acceptance or compliance
with non-mandatory forms of nonprofit self-regulation as mandatory
federal regulation and reporting requirements increase. Rather, it begins
to appear that the two trends are mutually reinforcing each other-that the
revised and more detailed regulatory and reporting requirements are both
encouraging and, perhaps indirectly, resulting from greater self-regulatory
efforts.
We have little data so far on how nonprofits are responding to this
seemingly side-by-side, silo-ized increase in both federal regulatory
requirements (through the Form 990) and encouragement from multiple
sides to comply with self-regulatory requirements. But many questions will
need to be addressed in this area. Will nonprofit boards and staff decide that
the requirements of the new Form 990, along with limited time, staff, and
resources, trump and de-prioritize efforts to comply with the new Principles
for Good Governance and Ethical Practice and other state and sectoral selfregulatory mechanisms? Or will organizations decide that the attention
that must be paid to the governance and other new aspects of the Form
990 makes consideration and compliance with the Principlesand other selfregulation codes, as well as sub-sectoral codes and practices, both more
important and easier and simpler to undertake? And, as appears likely,
will these multiple obligations merely increase the burdens on nonprofits,
especially smaller and grassroots organizations?16

II.

THE REGULATORY USES OF SELF-REGULATION:
EXAMPLES FROM OTHER FIELDS

The very preliminary questions I am raisingon notions of "federalization"
of self-regulation may be new to the nonprofit and philanthropic arena, but
aspects of this inquiry have been explored in other fields.
In the securities field, for example, scholars began to ask whether the
federal government is in effect "federalizing" securities self-regulation
either by adopting its mechanisms or by spurring more federal regulation
in the absence of effective self-regulation, even before the crisis of 200816 My colleague Willard Boyd has forcefully raised these concerns in multiple fora, including the deliberations of the Advisory Committee on Self-Regulation of the Charitable
Sector, Panel on the Nonprofit Sector convened by Independent Sector that produced the
PRINCIPLES FOR GooD GOVERNANCE AND ETHICAL PRACTICE: A GUIDE FOR CHARITIES AND

FOUNDATIONS.
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2009 that spurred further discussion of these issues.' 7 Administrative law
scholars have begun to explore whether federal agencies are increasing the
utilization of self-regulatory tools and results in their regulatory actions."
In other fields-organic food certification, the accreditation of higher
education, online marketing and privacy issues, the self-regulation of credit
rating agencies, enforced self-regulation in the securities industry, and (in
California) video game ratings-federal and occasionally state governments
have partly adopted or sought to strengthen self-regulatory initiatives that
come from industry.
One form of regulation that has been frequently used in other fields is
often termed "delegated regulation" or "audited self-regulation." In these
situations, a federal agency may delegate certain quasi-regulatory tasks to
a non-government group of some kind-tasks that could include gathering
data, examining information provided, checking on compliance, and other
work. Enforcement may occur through the self-regulatory industry group,
but often that power is held in the delegating governmental agency.
In the case of credit ratingagencies, for example, a form of self-regulation
eventually moved toward formal regulation of a sector. Credit rating
agencies were largely self-regulated until recently, but the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) now relies on credit rating agencies to
rate the creditworthiness of certain financial products, and in the wake of
Enron, there was a sense that they had failed in their work. In 2007, under
the Credit Rating Agency Act, the SEC required credit rating agencies
that were seeking registration as nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations ("NRSROs") to follow defined procedures, retain certain
records, file annual financial reports, implement written policies and
procedures to prevent the misuse of material nonpublic information, and
disclose conflicts of interest. NRSROs are also prohibited from engaging in
unfair, coercive, or abusive practices."
In the case of organicfood certification, in 2002 the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) adopted organic standards in its National Organic
Program based on the many independent standards that developed from
the 1970s through the 1990s (for example, self-regulatory certification of
organic farms began with California Certified Organic Farmers in 1973).20
Under this program, certification is still performed by private and state

17 See, e.g., Onnig H. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the SRO Identity
Crisis, I BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 317,324 (2007).
I8 See, e.g., Douglas C. Michael, FederalAgency Use ofAuditedSelf-Regulation as a Regulatory
Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 173-74 (1995).
19 See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of zoo6, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 20 U.S.C. (2oo6)).
20 About CCOF, CALIFORNIA CERTIFIED ORGANIC FARMERs, http://www.ccof.org/about.php
(last visited April 3, 201 I).
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agencies, making this a form of delegated regulation, at least in the case of
the private associational certifiers.2 1
Higher education and its accreditationstandards are a well-known form
of delegated regulation (including in the law school arena). Congress has
adopted standards that higher educational institutions are required to satisfy
before they qualify as providers or recipients of federal financial aid, but the
measurement and implementation of those standards is usually delegated
to a number of national and regional non-governmental accrediting
bodies. By congressional action, the Secretary of Education must release
a list of recognized accreditation agencies deemed reliable to evaluate the
educational quality provided by colleges and universities.z
The marketing ofprescriptiondrugs and medical devices is another form of
delegated regulation to industry. In very general terms, the prescription
drug and medical device industries pay "user fees" to fund traditional
public regulation. But the prescription drug industry is encouraged to police
itself by reporting violations of the "Bad Ad" program to the Division of
Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communications in the Food and Drug
Administration's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research for enforcement
under federal regulation."
Attempts are underway to "federalize" some aspects of the hitherto
self-regulated online marketingprivacy standards.Proposed legislation would
require online publishers, advertising firms, and other industry groups that
use private data to strengthen their notice to consumers of the use of online
consumer data. The enhanced requirements would be based on the Fair
Information Practices and the Network Advertising Initiative Principles
developed by user groups. So far, "the draft appears to be inspired by the
very approaches online publishers, ad firms, and industry groups have
employed in their own self-regulatory efforts."24
Finally-although there are other examples of "delegated regulation"
and other intersections between governmental regulation and selfregulation-at least one commentator has proposed that the strong link
between regulators and self-regulators in the securities industry, and the
powerful role of the National Association of Securities Dealers, be adapted
21 See Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 65o1-6523 (2oo6) (requiring the
USDA to establish organic standards). Standards are laid out in 7 C.ER. § 205 (2010).
22 See Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § lo99b (2oo6). The standards for recognizing accrediting agencies are laid out in 34 C.ER. § 602.1-5 (zoiI).
23 See Truthful Prescnption Drug Advertising and Promotion (Bad Ad Program), FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Surveillance/
DrugMarketingAdvertisingandCommunications/ucm2o9384.htm (last updated Mar. 17,
2011).
24 Kate Kaye, Privacy Bil/Mimics Industry Self-Regulation, CLICKZ (May 4, 20o), http://
www.clickz.com/clickz/news/1711 6o5/privacy-bill-mimics-industry-self-regulation; see STAFF
DiscussioN DAFr, iiith Cong. (201o), http://stearns.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.
aspx?DocumentlD=183894.
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for the nonprofit or more limited philanthropic context.25 The notion here,
as in many of the initiatives involving self-regulatory groups, is that the selfregulators already possess significant power, that more regulation in federal
(or state) hands is either inappropriate or unnecessary, and that linking or
delegating certain functions to private, self-regulatory groups makes sense.
These diverse industry examples may begin to indicate that two
key models in the relationship between industry self-regulation and
governmental regulation have emerged, at least in some fields. One is
the "takeover" model, in which self-regulatory norms eventually become
direct regulatory mandates. Another is the "delegated regulation" model,
in which government ties its regulation directly to self-regulatory tasks
being carried out by powerful industry self-regulators, and relies on selfregulatory standard compliance, monitoring, and other tasks implemented
by self-regulators.
Currently, at least to my knowledge, we see little evidence of these
models emerging into reality in the American nonprofit and philanthropic
arena. We have not yet seen situations in which self-regulatory norms
eventually become direct regulatory mandates in the "takeover" scenario.
Nor do we see formal kinds of "delegated regulation," in which the IRS or
other agencies tie their regulatory activities to self-regulatory tasks being
carried out by nonprofit self-regulators (or would-be, or even reluctant
self-regulators), such as the Council on Foundations, Independent Sector,
sectoral trade and monitoring groups (such as the Land Trust Alliance),
state nonprofit associations that work with state principles and codes,
and other self-regulatory or standard-setting groups. In the philanthropic
arena, where one commentator has called for the adoption of the strong
self-regulatory model used in the securities industry and relied upon by
federal authorities, 26 there appears no realistic prospect for any meaningful
link between federal (or state) regulation and self-regulation other than
foundation adherence to the relevant state-level principles and practices
for charitable excellence documents. The result in that important area
includes regular calls for great federal regulation and enforcement, regular
push-back by the private philanthropic industry, and virtually non-existent
self-regulation except for the impressive gains in the community foundation
arena through the National Standards for Community Foundations.

III.

DELEGATED REGULATION IN THE NONPROFIT ARENA: AN EXAMPLE FROM
NONPROFIT SELF-REGULATION ABROAD

Outside the United States, nonprofit self-regulation takes on many
forms, creating a fascinating diversity and pluralism in approaches to

25 JOEL FLEISHMAN, ThE FOUNDATION:
26

Id.

at

258-59.

A GREAT AMERICAN

SECRET 250-51, 259-6o (2007).

792

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 99

accountability at the national level. And, in a few countries, the question of
the relationship between growing nonprofit self-regulation and government
regulation has begun to come under more intensive discussion.
In Asia, where some of my work on this issue has focused' 7 there have
been many motivations for self-regulation to emerge and, as a result, often
multiple systems emerging within individual countries. These multiple
motivations for self-regulation include enhancing the collective reputation
of the sector, avoiding strengthened government regulation, obtaining the
benefits of allying strategically with government, using self-regulation
to eliminate nonprofit competitors, taking advantage of entrepreneurial
opportunities for self-regulation facilitators, and marginalizing low-quality
actors.28
The diverse motivations for collective action can thus lead in different
directions for self-regulation. They certainly have in Asia. And, in turn,
different relationships with "federal" or national government authorities
have developed. In several countries of Asia, the key self-regulatory
initiatives have capitalized and drawn strength from a decision by
government to delegate nonprofit tax status determination to nonprofit
self-regulators, giving the self-regulatory bodies a key role in the regulatory
process. The process is most advanced in the Philippines, where a form of
"delegated regulation" to a self-regulatory, certification body has been in
place since the 1990s. In effect, the Philippines has adopted one form of
"federalized" nonprofit self-regulation.
The Philippines has the single most well-known experience in
nonprofit self-regulation anywhere in Asia-in particular, the successful but
complex story of the Philippine Council for NGO Certification (PCNC).
The PCNC and its certification process are the result of direct cooperation
with government, backed up by government reliance on that certification
process to issue tax exemptions to nonprofit organizations. The concern
with nonprofit accountability in the Philippines, and a willingness to use
self-regulation to address it, goes back at least as far as the inauguration
of the Corazon Aquino government in 1986. At that time, a number of
nonprofit leaders joined the Aquino administration in one of the earliest
and most prominent forms of friendly alliance between the state and the
voluntary sector in Asia. In the early 1990s, the Philippine government
suggested a nonprofit certification mechanism and government-nonprofit
cooperation as the primary method for determining nonprofit "donee
institution status"-the tax status that confers deductibility for donations,
27 See, e.g., Mark Sidel, The Promise and Limits of Collective Action for Nonprofit SelfRegulation: Evidencefrom Asia, 39 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 1039 (2010); see also
Sidel,supra note o.
28 See Mary Kay Gugerty, Mark Sidel & Angela L. Bies, Introduction to Minisymposium,
Nonprofit Self-Regulation in Comparative Perspective-Themes and Debates, 39 NONPROFIT &
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 1027, 1032 (20o); see also Sidel, supranote 27, at 1040.
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providing direct government backing for a form of nonprofit certification
and self-regulation."
The idea for government-nonprofit collaboration in a delegated selfregulation process that would result in government determinations of
nonprofit tax status matured into the PCNC, which was founded in 1998 and
assigned the task of certifying nonprofits for donee institution status under
the Philippine tax code. The crucial role of the PCNC in this process and in
raising standards in the sector arises out of an agreement with government
for the nonprofit sector to play a significant role in a traditional government
responsibility-the granting of nonprofit tax status. In this way, a portion
of the Philippine nonprofit sector took charge of its own certification
process for nonprofit tax status, expanding that intensive examination
and certification process to include a "Seal of Good Housekeeping" for
nonprofit organizations.30
PCNC has certified more than 1,000 organizations thus far, with more
in the pipeline. And its goals have broadened as well: Today, the PCNC
certification process is "not only [intended] to pursue tax incentives
for donors to NGOs but also, and even more importantly, to promote
professionalism, accountability, and transparency among [NGO network]
PCNC pursues
members, and the Philippine non-profit sector."
the
tax
certification
process, by
these goals in a variety of ways: through
Housekeeping,"
through
capacityevaluating nonprofits for a "Seal of Good
personnel
as
peer
evaluators
building mechanisms, by involving nonprofit
and capacity builders, by speaking for the sector and for nonprofit selfregulation, and by other means."
The PCNC government-supported model has been discussed
throughout Asia by nonprofit networks and governments interested in selfregulation and certification. PCNC's intensive certification model may be
most usefully applicable around Asia when government-nonprofit relations
are close enough for substantive cooperation, and the government has

29 For more information on the PCNC, see PHILIPPINE COUNCIL FOR NGO CERTIFICATION
(PCNC), http://www.pcnc.com.ph/ (last visited Mar. II, 201I). For earlier discussions
of the Philippine experience, see Sidel, supra note 10; MARK SIDEL, TRENDS IN NONPROFIT

SELF-REGULATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION: INITIAL DATA ON INITIATIVES, EXPERIMENTS

(2003), available at http://zunia.org/iploads/medial
knowledge/marksegal.pdf (report prepared for the Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium
(APPC) Conference on Governance, Organizational Effectiveness and the Non-Profit Sector
held in Manila in Sept. 2003).
3o Background and Rationale, PHILIPPINE COUNCIL FOR NGO CERTIFICATION, http://www.
pcnc.com.ph/background-a-rationale.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2011).
AND MODELS IN SEVENTEEN COUNTRIES

31 Id.
32 Cerinfication of Non-Stock, Non-Profit Corporationsand Non-Government Organizationsfor
Donee Institution Status, PHILIPPINE COUNCIL FOR NGO CERTIFICATION, http://www.pcnc.com.
ph/certification-of-non-stock-non-profit-corporations-and-ngos-for-donee-institution-status.
html (last visited Mar. II, 201 1).
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directly sought voluntary sector assistance in fulfilling regulatory goals. In
the Philippines' case, the regulatory goal sought by the government was
assistance in certification for tax exemption. That merging of goals through
an intensive certification process also helps solve the problem of financial
sustainability that plagues discussions of most other certification and
accreditation models around Asia and well beyond. Organizations are far
more likely to pay for certification or other forms of self-regulation when it
is tied to a valuable government regulatory benefit, such as tax incentives.
The PCNC certification model is not the only nonprofit self-regulation
initiative in the Philippines. As in other countries, the interplay between
PCNC certification and other self-regulatory mechanisms is complex,
particularly where several self-regulatory processes or structures may apply
to individual organizations. In the Philippines, in recent years, the voluntary
sector has made progress in resolving these overlapping requirements, often
with the result that the PCNC certification process has been strengthened
as a core self-regulatory mechanism, a form of collective action that has
become considerably broader and more secure over time.
For example, the Code of Conduct for Development NGOs, created
by the Caucus of Development NGOs (Code-NGO) in the 1990s, was
developed into the Code of Conduct and became the Code-NGO Covenanton
PhilippineDevelopment. Part III of the Code-NGO Covenant, Responsibilities
of Development Non-Government Organizations, is generally referred
to as the "Code of Conduct." In the late 1990s and early 2000s, CodeNGO and its members faced questions about the overlapping nature of
the PCNC certification process and adherence to the Code of Conduct.
In 2003, Code-NGO-a core partner in the PCNC enterprise-sought to
resolve these complexities by making adherence to the Code consistent
with PCNC certification. Code-NGO "passed a landmark resolution that
advocates [for PCNC] certification of its members . . . . [as] the primary
strateg[y] for promoting transparency and accountability within [its]
ranks."33 Code-NGO resolved to maximize a mechanism that already
existed-the PCNC-rather than expending considerable effort and
resources developing and implementing a separate monitoring system.
There are multiple additional nonprofit self-regulatory mechanisms
in the Philippines that apply to particular subsectors of the voluntary
sector. But in some of these cases, as well, intensive efforts are underway
to harmonize sub-sectoral self-regulatory requirements with PCNC
certification. The Philippine Association of Foundations, for example, has
its own Code of Ethics to which it requires adherence by members, but it

33 Internal Refonn Initiaives, CODE-NGO, http://www.code-ngo.org/home (roll over
"Programs," then "Membership Development," and follow "Internal Reform Initiatives" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. II, 20I I).
34 Id.
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was also certified by PCNC in 2004. In turn, this organization encourages
its members to seek PCNC certification as a "top priority.""
The "delegated regulation" aspects of the Philippine PCNC process
itself-one of the more successful nonprofit self-regulatory efforts
anywhere in Asia-have not been enough to insulate PCNC from attempts
by governmental agencies to usurp its special role. Indeed, the special
role of PCNC and its certification process in government tax status
determinations have helped to spur bureaucratic warfare against this
merged model of delegated self-regulation.
In 2007, for example-illustrating the continuing complexities of
nonprofit self-regulation in the Philippines-PCNC and its certification
process for donee institution tax status came under direct attack from a
key government agency. The Philippine Department of Social Welfare
and Development drafted and obtained the signature of the Philippine
President on an Executive Order that divested PCNC of its role in
determining nonprofit tax status and clawed back that authority to
government, threatening, at least temporarily, to dissolve nearly a decade
of close government-nonprofit collaboration on nonprofit certification. In
November 2007, PCNC responded with a letter to Philippine President
Arroyo seeking recall or repeal of the Executive Order and a return to its
previous role in accrediting nonprofit tax status. The following January,
the president's office suspended enforcement of the Executive Order,
returning the situation to its previous state and reinstating the core role of
self-regulatory certification in the tax status process. 6
The PCNC "model" has become famous elsewhere in Asia and beyond,
but its applicability elsewhere has often been overstated because it relies
on the delegated regulation model in which the government, in effect,
delegates tax status determinations to PCNC certification decisions. That
linkage between government regulation of the sector and self-regulatory
processes currently appears in few other countries of Asia or elsewhere,
though it has sparked much discussion, sometimes mixed with envy for the
35 PCNC Certificationfor Members Still Top AF Priority,Assoc.
af.pfconline.org/news37.htm (last visited Mar. II, 201 ).

OF FOUNDATIONs,

http://

36 Sidel, supra note 27, at 1055 n.27; see also Establishment of a GovernmentNongovernment Partnership in the Accreditation of Donee Institutions Relative to the
Tax Deductibility of Charitable Contributions Under Section 34(H) of the National
Internal Revenue Code, As Amended, Exec. Ord. No. 720 (2008), O.G., P. 5500 (Phil.),
available at http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/indexio.php?doctype=Executive%2oOrders&
docid=1216349210124458644; Designating Appropriate Government Agencies to be the
Accrediting Entities that Will Certify and Accredit Charitable Organizations as DoneeInstitutions Relative to the Deductibility of Contributions or Gifts Received by Them, in
Relation to Section 34 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997, Exec. Ord. No. 671 (2007), O.G., p.
690 (Phil.), available at http://www.iccsl.org/pubs/12-13_EO_671.pdf; Letter from Board
of Trustees, Phil. Council for NGO Certification, to Madame Gloria Macapagal Arroyo,
President, Republic of the Phil. (Nov. 19, 2007), availableat http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/
news/2007/12-13 RepealLetter.pdf.
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strong role of self-regulatory certification processes in the Philippines." Yet
the Philippines' situation remains an interesting comparative case in which
government regulation and self-regulatory processes have come together
in ways that have served both governmental and sectoral interests-a "winwin" situation. In the Philippines, the government has greater confidence in
sectoral accountability and in the quality of decision-making on charitable
tax determinations. For the sector, self-regulation has been legitimized
and strengthened through its linkage to a key government decision on tax
status; "federalization" has strengthened self-regulation.
IV.

REDUCING UNNECESSARY BURDENS OF SELF-REGULATION

In the United States, the efforts by the Independent Sector Advisory
Committee on Self-Regulation of the Charitable Sector to devise an
implementable set of principles for nonprofit self-regulation encountered
problems similar to those in the Philippines. Most of the nonprofits to
which the Advisory Committee's principles apply are already governed
by self-regulatory norms within functional areas of work (i.e., associational
standards and accreditation), federal standards, and state standards (both
self-regulatory and regulatory). In the United States, we have not made
much progress in reducing these increasing burdens on nonprofits,
especially smaller and grassroots organizations-and I would say that they
are continuing to increase.
At the state level, where there is detailed understanding of the burdens
on smaller and grassroots organizations, these concerns about overlapping
government and self-regulation are taken seriously, and in some cases acted
upon. In at least one state, where a state-level "principles and practices"
document has been circulated for adherence by nonprofit organizations in
that state, the drafters were careful to try to minimize creating additional
burdens on smaller nonprofits.
In Iowa, the drafters of the state-level Iowa Principles and Practicesfor
CharitableNonprofit Excellence ("Principlesand Practices") provided broadly
for multiple ways to meet the Principles and Practices, in an attempt to
avoid unnecessary burdens on organizations in complying with multiple
standards and to recognize the work that many groups had already done.
An organization can comply with the Principles and Practices by having
its board adopt the Principlesand Practices by resolution or by training its
staff in the Principlesand Practices or through licensure or accreditation. If
an organization is accredited by a national organization or licensed by a
state agency, it will be "presumed to have significantly complied" with the
PrinciplesandPractices.

37 In Asia, there have been moves toward linking government regulation and self-regulatory processes in Pakistan, and discussions in India.

20IO--20II1

THE "FEDERALIZATION" PROBLEM

797

The Principles and Practices go on to make clear the breadth of the
drafters' commitment to reducing these multiple, or silo-ized, burdens
on local organizations. Compliance under the Principles and Practices can
be achieved through the sectoral regulation provided by "accreditation
systems for educational institutions, health organizations, and libraries" as
well as the accreditation or certification offered by United Way, Goodwill,
Girl Scouts of the USA and the Boy Scouts of America, the Salvation
Army, the American Red Cross, the National Council for Private School
Accreditation, the Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities,
the Continuing Care Accreditation Commission, the American Association
of Museums, the State Library of Iowa, and the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (now known as Joint
Commission). The multiple forms of state agency licenses are also cited as
counting for compliance, including license processes for adult day services
programs, animal shelters, assisted living programs, child care centers, child
foster care, child placement agencies, elder group homes, nursing facilities,
and substance abuse programs."
CONcLusION

It may well be that the "federalization" of nonprofit self-regulation is
not on the agenda in the United States, despite models from other industry
fields, recommendations in the philanthropic context, and other discussions
that might lead in that direction. Even some of the "federalizers" themselves
eschew the "federalization" of self-regulation or delegated self-regulation
as an effective mechanism for a stronger federal role. For example, Mayer
and Wilson quote a senior IRS official indicating:
[slome have argued that we do not need to be involved, because we can
count on the states to do their job and the sector to stay on the path of
self-regulation. While both state regulation and sector self-regulation are
important . . . we cannot delegate to others our obligation to enforce the

conditions of federal tax exemption."
Thus, some "federalizers" may, when faced with the prospect of
integrating their work more closely with increasing sectoral self-regulation,
view such a development as a distraction or a loss of federal power rather
than as a benefit for stricter and more effective regulation.
Increasingly, we appear to be observing distinct, parallel paths-an
increasing federal role, especially through the IRS, and increasing self38 IOWA GOVERNOR's NONPROFIT TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 2.
39 Mayer & Wilson, supra note 3, at 479 (quoting Sarah Hall Ingram, Comm'r, Tax
Exempt and Gov't Entities, IRS, Remarks at the Georgetown University Law Center
Conference: Issues in Nonprofit Governance (June 23, 2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-tege/ingram-gtown-governance-o623o9.pdf).
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regulatory requirements, standards, and burdens on nonprofit organizations.
For smaller and grassroots organizations, and even for some larger ones,
the prospect of increasing federal requirements, enhanced and diversified
(sometimes confusing and overlapping) self-regulatory mandates and
burdens, and increasing state regulation or enforcement must be daunting
to consider and confront. While the roles of federal regulation and
sectoral self-regulation have come together in one overseas case, that of
the Philippines discussed here, there appears relatively little prospect
that the models for federal use or delegation to self-regulation that have
occurred with increasing frequency in other industries in the United States
can be adapted to the nonprofit context. But these are initial inquiries,
introductory thoughts on the theme of "federalizing" nonprofit regulation.
The prospects, if any, for some sort of "federalization" of self-regulatory
requirements, standards, and norms will no doubt provoke more discussion
in the years ahead.

